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FORECASTING PRE-WORLD WAR I INFLATION: 
THE FISHER EFFECT REVISITED 
ABSTRACT 
We  consider  the puzzling  behavior  of interest  rates and 
inflation  in the United  States and the United Kingdom  between 
1879 and  1913.  A deflationary  regime prior to 1896 was  followed 
by an inflationary  one from 1896 until the beginning  of World  War 
I;  the average  inflation  rate was 3.8 percentage  points higher  in 
the second period  than in the  first.  Yet nominal  interest  rates 
were no higher  after 1896 than they had been before.  This non- 
adjustment  of nominal interest  rates would be consistent  with 
rational  expectations  if inflation  were not forecastable,  and 
indeed univariate  tests show little sign of serial correlation  in 
inflation.  However,  inflation  was forecastable  on the basis  of 
lagged gold production.  Investors'  expectations  of inflation 
should have  risen by at least three percentage  points  in the 
United  States between  1890 and 1910.  We consider  in an 
information  processing  context alternative  ways of accounting  for 
this failure  of interest  rates to adjust,  for example the 
possible beliefs  that increases  in gold production  might be 
transitory.  We conclude  that the  failure of investors to exhibit 
foresight  with regard to the shift in the trend  inflation  rate 
after  1896 is not persuasive  evidence  that  investors were 
negligent  or naive in processing  information. 
Robert B.  Barskv  J. Bradford De Long 
NBER  Department of Economics 
i050 Massachusetts Avenue  Boston University 
Cambridge, MA  02138  270 Bay State Road 
Boston, MA  02215 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue examined  in this paper—closely  linked to Irving Fisher and no 
closer to resolution now than when it first arose a century  ago—is the puzzling 
behavior of interest and  inflation rates during  the classical gold standard period 
before World War I.  We focus on the years from 1870, when the post-Civil 
War United States declared its intention to adopt gold, to the breakdown of the 
international  gold standard in 1914.  This period ought to be an ideal laboratory 
for studying issues in monetary economics,  as it included major changes in the 
money stock that arose from largely  exogenous  gold discoveries. 
During the first half of this period the U.S. underwent deflation.  From 
1870 to 1896 the national product deflator  of Friedman and  Schwartz (1982) 
declined  at an average rate of 1.1  percent per year, although shorter—term  price 
changes were erratic.  This trend was then reversed—over the period  1896— 
1914, the U.S. price level increased  at 2.5 percent per year.  A comparable shift 
in inflation is exhibited by the Warren-Pearson  (1933) wholesale price index.  A 
similar though less extreme shift for the United  Kingdom is seen in the GNP 
deflator  (Friedman and Schwartz (1982)), in the Sauerbeck-Statist wholesale 
price index, and in the Rousseaux WPI (Mitchell and Deane (1965)),  Plots of 
the American and British price levels exhibit a pronounced "V," with a turning 
point in 1896. 
Irving Fisher's  theory of interest (Fisher (1930)), according to which 
nominal interest rates adjust one-for-one to changes in  steady-state inflation, 
suggests that nominal rates should have been some 300 basis points higher along 
the rising portion of the "V" than during 1879-1896.  Although in the short run 
cyclical movements in real rates (e.g.,  Friedman's (1965) liquidity effect) might 
dominate the relationship between interest rates and inflation, in the long run 
there should be a  one-to-one relationship between changes in  inflation arid 4  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
express considerable doubts about this line of thought,  particularly the twenty- 
year lag in the formation of expectations needed if the Gibson paradox is seen as 
a delayed Fisher effect. 
TABLE 1 
AVERAGE INTEREST AND INFLATION RATES 
United States 
3-Month  RR Bond  Inflation 
_________________________ __________ ____________  Rate  Rate  Rate 
5.7%  4.7%  -1.8% 
4.6%  3.6%  2.0% 
-1.1%  -1.1%  +3.8% 
E 
I- 
0  -J 
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Fisher (1906), perceiving a marked change in the secular rate of inflation 
which he saw as directly linked  to the greatly-increased output of the world's 
gold mines, provided a scathing  attack on the relevance of his own theory of the 
relation between  interest rates and inflation: 
during  1898-1905 the increase of prices in the United  States is 
United Kingdom 
3-Month  Consol  Inflation 
Period  Rates  Rates  Rate 
1870-1896  2.8%  3.0%  -0.6% 
1897-1913  3.1%  2.8%  0.9% 
Change  +0.3%  -0.2%  +1.5% 
1870  1875  1880  1885  1890  1895  1900  1905  1910 
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known  to  have  been  due  largely to the  increase in gold 
production....  There seems,  therefore, no reason which would 
justify the low commodity [real] interest rate of 1.8 percent 
which we found to have been virtually paid during that period. 
This  low rate  must, in all  probability,  have  been  due to 
inadvertence.  The inrushing streams of gold caught merchants 
napping.  They should have stemmed  the tide by putting up 
interest, not only to 4.6 percent, as they did, but two or three 
pertent higher 
Such inadvertence  on  the part of "merchants" is striking in  view of 
Fisher's incredulity only twenty pages earlier in The  Rate of Interest at the 
thought that agents might suffer from inflation  illusion—i.e. that they do not 
notice that their nominal return i is different from their real return r: 
Foresight  is  clearer  and  more prevalent  to-day than ever 
before.  Multiples of trade journals and  investors'  reviews 
have their chief reason for existence in  supplying data on 
which to base prediction.  Every chance for gain is eagerly 
watched for.  An active and  keen speculation is constantly 
going on which, so far as it does not consist of fictitious and 
gambling  transactions, performs  a well-known  and provident 
function for society.  is it reasonable to believe that foresight, 
which is the general rule, has an exception as applied to falling 
or rising prices? 
Summers  (1983) used several tools, notably spectral  techniques  that tried 
to  capture the long run in which Fisher's  effect should hold, and  found no 
correlation between short-term or long-term  rates and inflation  rates in U.S. 
data before 1940.  He concluded that nominal rates had not adjusted to changes 
in inflation and that real rates Were persistently affected by changes  in monetary 
growth: 
The data for 1860 to 1940 indicate no  tendency for interest 
rates to increase with movements in expected  inflation....  [The] 
facts... at least raise the possibility that some form of money 6  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
illusion infects financial  markets.  All are explicable by the 
hypothesis that before the war agents ignored inflation in 
making financial calculations (Summers  (1982), P. 232). 
Barsky  (1987) provided an alternative  explanation  for  the  lack of 
correlation between interest and inflation rates before 1914.  He noted (as did 
others,  e.g. Sargent (1973), Klein (1975),  Shiller and  Siegel (1977), Benjamin 
and Kochin (1984)) that inflation  was serially uncorrelated during this period. 
Thus its one period univariate forecast was  constant,1  and consequently the 
Fisher effect could have been built into the pre-WWI economy yet not be visible 
because there were no shifts in expected inflation.  Building on the analytics of 
McCallum (1983),  he concluded that Summers'  regressions did not bear on the 
truth of Fisherian theory.  The lack of correlation between cx Dost inflation and 
interest rates could be due to the failure of inflation—largely  noise—to convey 
information about future inflation. 
Barsky noted that inflation  was slightly forecastable by  lagged gold 
production,  but stopped  short of examining fully  the implications of  this 
observation.  Moreover, the restriction of analysis to parsimonious univariate 
models removed from consideration  models with long lag structures that might 
have picked up a small but important  forecastable component in inflation.  Dc 
Long (1987) defended the view that pre-WWI data suggest a failure of the 
Fisher effect.  He aligned himself with Fisher (1930),  Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963, 1982) and Cagan (1984) in affirming  the "traditional" view of price 
movements during the gold standard.  The traditional view divides  the period 
into two distinct regimes:  an era of falling prices before and an era of rising 
prices after 1896, with the switch in regimes triggered by increases in gold 
production which were foreseen—or at least foreseeable—by investors at the 
time. 
1And in fact nearly zero.  The average rate of inflation over 1879-1914 as measured by the 
implicit national product deflator in both the US and UK is close to 0.4  percent per year. 7  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
We thus have  two contrasting views of the pre-1914  link  between 
inflation and interest rates.  The view sympathetic to Fisher's theory emphasizes 
that hindsight is always 20-20, that the switch  in the average rate of inflation 
which from an ex tost viewpoint took place in 1896 was not necessarily seen as 
such at the time, and that there is little  formal evidence that inflation before 
World War I was forecastable even  with  the tools of modem  time  series 
analysis.  The alternative, not reconcilable with Fisher's theorizing—though it 
does fit his own rather nihilistic interpretation  of the empirical  evidence—seems 
more compatible with the historian's sense that investors perceived, or should 
have perceived, long swings in the trend of prices.  The present paper brings 
together the elements of truth in both views, and assesses to what extent Fisher 
was correct in rejecting his own theory on the basis of pre-WWI evidence. 
We try to infer what investors should have thought about future inflation 
and what investors did think as revealed in the reporting of the financial press. 
Most important, we assess the value of information on gold mining in fore- 
casting changes in average inflation as they were occurring.  Our finding  that 
gold production  helps to forecast inflation (albeit with a small R2) may appear 
surprising in view of the fact that gold mining is persistent while inflation 
appears white noise.  On reflection these observations are not incompatible. 
Gold mining conveys  a signal about a subtle persistent component in inflation 
sufficiently buried in short-term noise as to escape detection by low-order uni- 
variate ARJv1A models. Gold production  is a necessary cofactor to lend inflation 
a degree of forecastability  as the shift in the drift of prices was occurring.  The 
coincidence of the expansion of gold production  and the shift to upward drift in 
the price level lends us confidence—through  the force of the quantity theory— 
that the "V" in the price level is not a spurious trend like those that chartists find 
in random walks. 
Because we find some forecastability  in inflation and not the slightest hint 10  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
In this  section we provide a brief survey of the historical circumstances 
surrounding the Australian and  South African gold  discoveries,  and  the 
development and commercial implementation of the cyanide process for gold 
extraction.  The history of gold production in the nineteenth century is domi- 
nated by the two "rushes" of the 1850's and the 1890's From the perspective of 
a century or more, these rushes are perhaps best seen as endogenous responses to 
industrialization:  the gold was there, and would be discovered and mined at 
some point if the price of gold were high enough.  But from the standpoint of a 
decade or a generation, the two expansions in gold production take on  the 
character of  exogenous shocks to the world's monetary system.  Figure 4 shows 
contemporaneously  available  estimates, reported in the Financial Review Annual 
supplement to the New York Commercial and Financial Chronicle, of world 
gold production from the Middle Ages to the outbreak of World War I; figure 5 
concentrates  on the period since 1800 and shows the same data in the form of the 
proportional rate of increase of the world's cumulative  mined gold stock. 
Annual gold production increased by  a factor of five during the gold 
rushes of the  1850's, and then leveled  off in the 1870's and  1880's.  Gold 
production then doubled from its level  during the 1870's and  1880's in  the 
1890's, and had doubled once again by 1910.  The proportional rate of increase 
in the world's gold stock thus exhibits two peaks, in the 1850's and 19 10's, and 
an intermediate trough.  The two rushes are not of negligible magnitude:  they 
each increased the world's total mined gold supply relative to trend by a third. 11  Forecasting  PreWWI  Inflation 
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The gold rushes  of the 1850's raised  North America and Australia to the 
ranks of the world's largest gold producers.  The expansion of gold production 
was very rapid.  Gold deposits were rich and could be mined by hand.  No great 
input  of capital or infrastructure was  required before  Australia and  North 12  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
America could begin producing gold in large quantities. 
The  1880's saw the three  largest  gold  producers—North  America, 
Australia, and Russia, in that order—produce more than three quarters of the 
total addition to the world's gold supply (Financial Review Annual(1913)).  A 
small discovery of deposits in South Africa led to prospecting which culminated 
in the discovery of the main reef of gold deposits in the Rand region of South 
Africa—present  day Johannes-burg—in  1886 (Wheatcroft  (1985)).  The 1890's 
saw significant discoveries in Australia and in North America.  By 1906-1910 
Australian and North American production had each tripled relative to their 
1886-1890 levels.  Of the "big three" of gold producers  before  1890,  only 
Russia had failed to significantly increase its gold output.  But the most dramatic 
addition to gold output in the post-1890 period came from the exploitation of 
South African gold deposits in particular the Rand. 
In spite of the discovery of the Rand gold reef in 1886, it took almost a 
generation for mining operations to become fully established.  In  1887 South 
Africa produced only 28,000 ounces of gold.  By 1890 production was up to 
480,000 ounces. This was less than ten percent of the world's gold produc-tion 
in 1890, only twelve percent of what the Rand would produce in 1899,  and only 
a twentieth of what the Rand would produce in the years immediately preceding 
World War I.  The long lapse of time between the discovery of the Rand on the 
one hand and the full establishment  of gold mining on the other stems from two 
causes:  the poor quality of the Rand's gold deposits, and the isolated location of 
the gold field.  By contrast, the gold discoveries of the  1850's were quickly 
exploited. 
The Rand gold deposits are the largest and among the poorest in the 
world. By 1889—only  three years after the discovery  of the gold field and after 
only some 600,000 ounces had been recovered—gold  production in South Africa 
faced a technological barrier. The remaining gold was spread thinly throughout 13  Forecasting  Pre-WWJ Inflation 
quartz and sulfur-iron pyrite; previous standard methods of extraction could  not 
be used.  The telluride ores of Australia and Colorado can contain up  to  40 
percent gold by weight, but ores in South Africa contained less than one percent 
gold (Wheatcroft (1985)). 
The only way to recover gold from such ores  is  the cyanide process. 
Finely-ground ore is added to a solution of calcium cyanide and lime.  The gold 
combines with  cyanide, and  can then be precipitated by adding  zinc.  The 
cyanide process can extract up to nineteen-twentieths  of the gold in the ore (Wise 
(1964)). 
1  Profitable  use  of the cyanide process  requires the processing of 
enormous  amounts  of ore. 
Gold mining  in South Africa was thus a very different industry from the 
placer,  hydraulic, or lode mining of Australia or North America.  Gold mining 
in  South  Africa involved the large  scale use of recently-discovered organic 
chemical processes:  South African gold production was one of the high-tech 
industries of the 1890's.  The sophistication  of the technology and the large size 
of efficient scale quickly led to  the consolidation of the South African gold 
industry into a tight oligopoly under the leadership of Rhodes and Oppenheimer 
(Wheatcroft (1985),  Flint (1974)).2 
When the sophistication  of the technology  required to exploit the Rand is 
combined with the reef's location far from transportation to Europe, it seems 
natural that it might take more than a decade for  exploitation to  reach  full 
intensity.  In 1886 there were some 1800 miles of railroad laid in South Africa, 
but they were concentrated near the Cape of Good Hope to provide a network 
for the export of agricultural products.  The furthest north the railroad line 
'One major source of  increased production in Australia and North America after 1890  was the use 
of  the cyanide extraction  process on the tailings left behind by earlier gold mining operations 
2The rapid concentration of  the South African gold industry is strongly suggestive of  the presence 
of economies of  scale of  the sort that Chandler(1978) argues lie behind the formation of  large, 
hierarchically-managed, oligopolistic business organizations in the U.S. in the late nineteenth 
century. 14  Foresting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
from Cape Town reached in  1886 was  the diamond town of Kimberly on the 
border of what was  then the Orange Free State, still some 300  miles  from 
Johannesburg  (Hobson (1900),  Wheatcroft  (1985)). 
By 1895 railroad mileage had doubled from  1886, and Johannesburg was 
connected by rail  to  seaports from Cape Town  on  the Atlantic to Lorenco 
Marques in Mozambique (Wheatcroft (1985)).  The tremendous  investment 
required to establish the South African mining industry and link it to industrial 
Europe was  being made.  By  1913  British capital invested in South Africa 
amounted to  some £27 per capita—about equal to a year's worth of South 
African gross national product,  More Western European capital was  invested 
per capita in South Africa than in any other area of the globe outside  the regions 
of mass  European migration and  settlement of Argentina, Australasia,  and 
Canada (De Long (1988)). 
There is reason to believe that analysts could have foreseen the expansion 
in production before it was well under way (Wheatcroft (1986)).  This point is 
reinforced by parallels between the gold discoveries  at the end and in the middle 
of the nineteenth century.  The gold booms of the 1850's and the 1890's involved 
very similar sudden shifts in the rate at which the world's total supply of gold 
was increasing.  Anyone who believed that investors and traders have to learn 
how prices respond to shocks still has to confront the fact that investors and 
traders could learn about the shifts in the monetary environment likely to come 
in the 1890's by studying the 1850's before she can conclude that the effects of 
the Rand took the world by surprise. 
From the perspective of an investor in the 1890's, uncertainties intervene. 
Before anyone could conclude that the rush of the 1890's was of a magnitude 
similar to the rush of the 18  50's, she would have had to resolve three questions: 
First, how fast would the gold of South Africa be mined?  Second,  how long 
would the gold last?  Third, would there be any offsets from central bank beha- 15  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
vior?  Would the increase  in  total gold induce an increase  in  private gold 
reserves, an increase in sterile public  gold holdings, a substitution of gold cash 
for fiduciary money, or even an expansion in the gold area itself?  Disturbing 
causes at any one of these points could interrupt  the transmission  mechanism that 
leads from the gold stock to the price level. 
III.  STATISTICAL  FORECASTS  OF INFLATION 
ARIMA Characterizations  of Price Level Dynamics 
As Barsky (1987) argued, the absence of any correlation between cx post 
inflation rates and nominal  interest rates may not be strong evidence against the 
Fisher effect.  If inflation  was  unforecastable, there would be no  correlation 
between ex post inflation  and interest rates even if the Fisher effect did hold. 
One way to assess the forecastability of inflation is to estimate  univariate 
stochastic processes for inflation and see how much of inflation  variance is 
predictable from its own past.  A lack of serial correlation in inflation might be 
a sign that investors before WWI found inflation very difficult to forecast.  Box- 
Jenkins procedures do identify the price level over 1870-1914 as a random walk 
with little  drift, and the inflation rate consequently  as approximately zero-mean 
white noise, in both the U.S. and the U.K.: 
TABLE 2 
PRE-WORLD WAR I INFLATION AUTOCORRELATIONS, 1870-19 14, 
QUARTERLY  DATA 
United States 
Lag 1-8  .02  -.03  .10  -.03  -.09  -.08  -.02  .07 
Lag 9-16  .08  .06  .00  .14  -.06  -.21  -.10  .08 
United Kingdom 
Lag 1-8  .20  .03  .21  -.07  -.19  .03  -.08  -.11 
Lag9-16  .14  .00  -.06  .12  -.11  -.23  -.06  .04 16  Forecasting  Pre-WWI Inflation 
These tests do not reject the null of white  noise inflation.  For the U.S., 
statistics are in fact smaller than expected under the null of no serial dependence: 
Q(8)=3.2, compared to an expected value of 8 and a .05 cutoff of 15.5, for the 
United States.  The test statistics suggest  some deviations of UK inflation from 
white noise:  Q(8) =  14.6 compared to the .05 cutoff of 15.5.  But test statistics 
against the null that inflation is an MA(1) at quarterly levels are all well within 
their expected ranges;  whatever deviations from white noise do exist in the UK 
price level appear to be at short horizons. 
The Correlation Between  Gold Production  and Inflation 
Inflation under the gold standard shows little persistence, and the pace  at 
which gold was mined exhibits  great persistence.  Yet  inflation and  gold 
production are correlated.  The simple correlation between this year's  inflation 
and last year's gold production is .4  for the United States and  .2 for the United 
Kingdom using the 1870-1914 sample period,  and .3  for either the United States 
or the United Kingdom over the 1879-1914  period.  A small, but nonzero part 
of the year-to-year variance in inflation is forecastable from knowledge of one 
lag of gold production.  1 
The correlation between the persistent gold production series  and  the 
volatile inflation  series comes from the association of the upward leap in gold 
production in the 1890's with the upward shift in average inflation.  But the 
correlation  is  not solely  the  result  of this  one  shift  in  gold  production. 
Wholesale price indices for the U.K. reveal that the correlation between price 
changes and  gold production holds, for the gold standard country of Great 
Britain, just as strongly for the pre-1870 as for the post-1870 period. 
1The oniy troubling note is the size of  the estimated coefficient of the response of  the price level to 
an increase in gold production. The quantity theory would lead one to expect a coefficient of  one, 
yet for the U.S. NP deflator and the British WP index, the coefficient is closer to two—albeit 
imprecisely  estimated.  We discuss the non.structural  nature of these regressions in the next 
Section. 17  Forecasting Pre-\VWI Inflation 
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TABLE 3 
INFLATION REGRESSED ON GOLD PRODUCTION 
Dependent  Standard  Durbin 
Variable  Period  Coefficient  Error  Watson  F2 
USGNP  1870-1913  2.11  0.70  2.20  .16 
Deflator  1880-1913  1.65  0.76  2.38  .10 
UK GNP  1870-1913  0.79  0.46  1.66  .05 
Deflator  1880-1913  0.75  0.41  2.17  .08 
UKWPI  1848-1913  2.59  0.78  1.72  .12 
(Sauerbeck-  1870-1913  2.17  0.98  1.64  .09 
Statist)  1880-1913  2.47  0.91  1.81  .11 
The predictability  of inflation from gold production leads one to expect a 
correlation between nominal interest and that portion  of inflation which is itself 
correlated with gold production.  But as table 4  below  shows, instrumental 
variable regressions of interest on ex post inflation rates—which  would produce 
coefficients of unity if past gold production was being properly used to forecast 
future inflation  and if the Fisher relationship held—in every  case  produce 
coefficients that are almost zero. 
TABLE 4 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSIONS OF INTEREST RATES ON 
INFLATION RATES,  1880-19  14 
Standard 
Nation  Maturity  Frequency  Coefficient  Eii!2i 
U.S.  Short-term  Quarterly  .054  .213 
U.S.  Short-term  Annual  -.239  .140 
U.S.  Long-term  Annual  -.269  .100 
U.K.  Short-term  Annual  .086  .073 
U.K.  Long-term  Annual  .004  .028 
Learning  About the Relationshin  between  Gold and Prices 
One objection to table 4 is that even if gold production is useful  for 
forecasting inflation over 1870-1914  ex post, it is not necessarily the case that 19  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
rational traders and investors could have, or should have, ex ante expected gold 
production to be useful for forecasting inflation.  But  this  objection is hard to 
sustain if one analyzes the 1895-1913 gold boom in the context of the gold boom 
of the  1850's.  Wholesale price indices are available for the entire nineteenth 
century, and gold has a positive correlation with inflation over every part of the 
nineteenth century for the United Kingdom, which was on the gold standard 
from the  end of the Napoleonic Wars until the beginning of World War I.  A 
similar exercise cannot be carried out for the United States, which inflated to 
fight the Civil War. 
TABLE 5 




Period  Coefficient  Error 
1848-1913  2.59  .78 
1848-1900  3.29  .98 
1848-1890  3.06  1.10 
1848-1880  2.97  1.34 
1848-1870  3.20  1.53 
1870-1913  2.17  .91 
1880-1913  2.47  .91 20  Forecasting  PreWWI  Inflation 
FIGURE  8 
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Proportionel  Increese in World Gold Stock 
The constancy of the relationship between the rate of increase of the world's 
gold stock and price increases over the nineteenth century is extraordinary.  An 
investor using the standard hypothesis-testing  methodology would by 1900 have 
been able to reject the null of no relationship between gold  production  and 
inflation at the .05 level.  The fact of association before 1900 should have led 
investors to pay close attention to gold production in forming forecasts of likely 
future price changes  in the 1890's and after. 
IV.  ACTUAL EXPECTATiONS  OF INFLATION  BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
Future  inflation is  correlated with  past  gold production.  Past gold 
production is in investors' information  sets.  Yet there is no positive relationship 
between that portion of inflation forecastable from lagged gold production and 
nominal interest rates.  It might appear that we can conclude that there is strong 
evidence that money illusion was the rule, rather than the exception, before 
World War I even among that critical mass of well-informed speculators that 
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fundamental  values (Friedman (1953)). 
But the case for the conclusion that investors ought to have been using 
gold production to forecast future inflation  rates may not be as strong as it 
appears.  We have followed the accepted canons of procedure by assuming that 
investors know the parameters of the model—that inflation  is correlated with 
lagged gold production.  But if investors are uncertain about the parameters. 
then it is no longer clear that the instrumental  variables regressions of table four 
are powerful evidence against the Fisher effect.  Only if investors know a priori 
the rate at which changes in the world's gold production  translate into changes in 
the drift of the price level is it clear that the optimal forecast of inflation  would 
pick up the shift in the mean rate of inflation  in the decade of the  1890's in 
which it took place. 
In this section we consider not what inflation  expectations should have 
been but what actual inflation expectations  were and with why such expectations 
were  held.  We examine two bodies of evidence,  first the academic debate over 
the quantity theory and the causes of secular changes in prices carried out in the 
forerunners of the American Economic  Review, and second the journalistic 
assessments of gold, prices, inflation,  and interest rates contained in the London 
Economist.  Although we find a  great deal of interest  in  the rate of gold 
production and the causes of secular price changes, we find no consensus of 
informed positions and no explicit forecasts of positive inflation in the years 
before WWII. 
Academic Opinion 
An American bond trader who turned to academic opinion for inflation 
forecasts for a model on which to base an analysis of price level changes faced 
no easy task, for economists in the U.S. were divided.  One could not read the 
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become an economist and judge the monetarist-antimonetarist  debate for oneself. 
We have argued above that attachment  to the quantity theory would have allowed 
investors  to  recognize the shift in average inflation.  However, no  investor 
approaching the economics debate  with an uninformed mind would come away 
convinced that the quantity theory was the proper framework to use to analyze 
inflation. On the monetarist side of the debate stood economists like Irving 
Fisher who  were  strong believers  in  the quantity theory  and  in  the close 
dependence of the quantity of money on the gold stock.  On the antimonetarist 
side stood economists  like Laurence Laughlin and David Wells who believed  in a 
"cost of production" theory of the price level. 
Laughlin (1894) claimed that "it is arrant demagogism to try  to make 
cotton growers believe that the free coinage of silver can in any way restore the 
price of cotton, when the fall is due  to excessive crops." Wells (1895) argued 
that "the recent phenomenal decline  in prices [over the preceding twenty years] 
is due  so largely to the great multiplication and cheapening of commodities 
through new conditions of production and distribution, that the influence of any 
or all  other  causes  combined  in  contributing  to  such  a  result  has  been 
inconsiderable."  Wells attributed the decline  in the nominal  price of wheat to 
declines in freight charges, claiming that reductions in transportation costs were 
"an agency which sufficiently accounts  for a great part of the decline in the price 
of wheat, and which would have operated  all the same even if the relative values 
of the precious metals... had remained unaltered." 
Orthodox monetarist  critiques of Laughlin and  Wells appear, to us, 
convincing. Kinder (1899), for example, points out that transportation costs had 
been falling and production growing for decades before 1870 and had not then 
been  accompanied  by  falling  prices.  Irving Fisher (1911)  convincingly 
decomposes  changes in prices into changes caused by movements  in real income, 
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monetarists are not convinced.  Of the five joint discussants of Fisher (1911) and 
Laughlin (1911) at the 1910 American Economic Association meetings, three 
criticize Fisher and support Laughlin on the grounds that the money  supply is 
endogenous and has at best a tangential relationship  to the gold stock.' 
The assessment  of American  economists  as  evenly  split  between 
supporters and opponents of the quantity theory is not ours alone.  Keynes 
(1912), lecturing his students before World War I, declared that in Britain the 
dominance of the quantity theory was complete but that in America the pro- 
fession was fairly  evenly split.2  Keynes himself had no doubt but that the 
expanded  pace of world gold production  meant,  given the long-run trends in real 
production and in financial  sophistication,  slow inflation.  He predicted that "...it 
seems likely that the annual rise of prices during the next few years can hardly 
be less than two or three percent.  Credit booms and depressions are likely.., to 
make the upward movement irregular." 
The lesson we draw from  this is that any American trader who, before 
World War  I,  turned to the literature  of academic  economics  for help  in 
untangling the determinants of price level changes faced a difficult task.  In the 
United  States a respected  economist could be found to  set forth either  the 
conclusion that changes in the long-run rate of drift of the price level were due 
to changes in the volume of gold production, or that changes in the long-run rate 
of drift of the price  level were not due to changes in the volume of gold 
production but to "such things as labor unions, monopolies, extravagance, the 
tariff, general prosperity, etc." (Houston (1911)).  Even in Britain, where the 
community of academic economists  was effectively  united, they perceived them- 
selves as having little influence on the thinking of people of affairs.  Keynes 
(1912)—then  still a strong monetarist—  lamented the fact that: 
'Fisher's preeminence in this company, although obvious to us, was apparently not clear to 
contemporary observers, especially those outside academic economics. 
2Keynes attributed this fact to the failure of  American economists to read Alfred Marshall. 24  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
a rise in prices always appears to be due  to  'conditions  of 
trade,' and in the case of every article taken by itself a rise  in 
its price is always due to an increase in the demand for it or to 
a decrease in the supply... as  a proximate cause.  This is the 
chief reason why some bankers and many businessmen have 
always been inclined to doubt the connection of the level  of 
prices to the volume  of money—because  they cannot perceive 
through what channels the influence of the one upon the other 
is exerted. 
The disarray of the economics profession in the United States and the lack 
of authority  of the economics profession in the United Kingdom made it unlikely 
that participants in the financial markets would be taught by economists to use 
the quantity theory as a basis for analysis and forecasting. 
The Economist  and Its Forecasts 
We also searched for signs that the commercial and financial  world  had 
reached practical  conclusions  about the  structure of the economy that the 
academic world had not.  We sought for some sign that the presence of lagged 
gold production in agents' information  sets did lead at least some to anticipate 
rises in prices as a result of gold discoveries. 
Our search took us to the London Economist, as the natural place to find 
such anticipations if they were held.  The London Economist  stands out as a 
stronghold of the quantity theory throughout the period of the pre-WWI gold 
standard.  It (August 14,  1897) heaps scorn on Sir Robert Giffin,  who had set 
himself to demonstrate  that "it  is the range of prices.., which helps to determine 
the quantity of money  in use, and not the quantity of money  in  use  which 
determines prices," and argues that Giffin's articles themselves demonstrate the 
falsity of Giffin's doctrine that the money supply is sufficiently endogenous  that 
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stronghold of the quantity theory, this newspaper should be the locus of much 
writing that gold discoveries will change the long-run rate of drift of the price 
level.  Yet the quantity-theoretic Economist does not forecast that the wave of 
gold discoveries  in the 1890's will have an appreciable  effect on prices. 
It is not clear how much weight we should place on our inability to find 
explicit forecasts of future prices that recognize the shift in  inflation that took 
place around 1896.  We have negative evidence only:  the dog did not bark in the 
night.  Nevertheless the fact that this newspaper, with its commitment to the 
quantity theory and its intellectual predisposition to analyze and theorize about 
the economy rather than merely report, did not make the inflation forecasts we 
regard as natural—did not take  the linear projection of inflation on  past gold 
production  and use this projection to assess likely future price changes—suggests 
that few if any  investors in  the pre-WWI period saw the two relationships 
between gold and money and between money and prices as sufficiently strong 
and reliable to be useful for forecasting  purposes. 
The Economist does recognize that the world's rate of gold production 
has undergone a substantial shift even before the trough of the price level in 
1896.  In 1895, when the newspaper attempts  to assess the likely effect of the 
gold discoveries of the 1890's, it looks back to the Australian and Californian 
gold rushes  of 1848-1851.  Some then thought  that such a wave of gold 
discoveries must have had large effects on prices.  An 1872 letter to the editor 
(Thomas Hankey, June 15, 1872) notes that gold production from  1850-1870 
was equal to the amount of gold brought to Europe from Latin America over 
1500-1800, and asks  whether "a great  effect  [on prices]  must not now  be 
experienced by the additional production of an equally large amount during so 
comparatively  a short time as twenty  years?" 
The Economist's  1872 answer is that it did not, that the rise  in  gold 
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general price level.  It stresses  how  "neutralizing  circumstances... the great 
increase of population and wealth which has occurred... since  1848" raised the 
demand for gold sufficiently that the increased supply did not lead to any price 
rises.  The conclusion ultimately arrived at is that "we should be inclined to 
doubt whether it could be proved that the general purchasing power  of the 
sovereign  has much diminished  since 1850" (June 29,  1872). 
According to the available price indices, this assessment  by the Economist 
is wrong.  Table 5 above reveals that the gold rushes of the  18 50's did have an 
effect on prices—an effect not statistically significant over 1848-70 in spite of its 
large magnitude.  The break  in the 1850's in the declining trend in prices that 
characterizes the rest of the century should have kept the Economist from con- 
cluding that there had been no rise in prices as a result of the gold discoveries of 
the 18  50's.  Perhaps distrust of price indices as measures of the true price level 
accounts for the position  that the 1850's rushes had little effect on prices. 
In 1895 the Economist bases its judgment of the likely effect of increased 
gold mining on its perception that the burst of mining around 1850 had little 
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effect on the price level: 
"When  some fifty years  ago,  first  California and  then 
Australia began to pour out.., gold, the Gold Question... 
came... to be the great economic question of the day.... 
Broadly speaking, the general expectation was that, owing 
to the enormous increase in output... there would be a great 
diminution in the purchasing power of gold or...  a great 
rise in the prices of commodities.... It did not take long, 
however, to prove that... the hopes and fears excited by... 
new gold...  were greatly exaggerated.... Thus  Professor 
Jevons, writing in 1863, pointed out that 'even after the 
lapse of ten or twelve years, men who give their whole 
attention to monetary matters... remain in a state of doubt 
as to whether any  depreciation of gold  is  really  taking 
place'. And as late as 1873, while maintaining  that he had 
been right in predicting a depreciation of gold, Professor 
Cairnes  wrote  'It is now  generally  agreed that  within 
twenty years a substantial advance in  general prices has 
taken place.  But beyond the general conviction there is 
little accord.  People differ as to the extent of the advance 
and as to its cause.... Amongst economists... it is pretty well 
agreed that the advance  is... due  to... gold  discoveries. 
But... there is, on the part of commercial writers and... all 
who view the question from the standpoint of practical 
business, a strong disposition to ignore.., the influence of 
this cause"  (September  28,  1895). 
The quantity-theoretic link between the quantity  of gold and  the level  of 
prices is thus seen as weak in general.  The  Economist is doubtful that gold 
mining will raise prices in the particular instance of the South  African gold 
discoveries for at least three reasons. The first is its—ex post false—assessment 
that the extent of the Rand discoveries will never match in total volume  of gold 
those of the Californian and Australian discoveries of mid-century. The second 
is the Economist's belief  that what matters for the price level is the proportional 
increase in gold and the gold stock is much larger.  And the third arises from the 
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is a very capital intensive industry (September  28,  1895) as discussed in section 
II above.  From our perspective, the Economist was wrong ex post.  But it is not 
clear that the Economist was wrong ex ante.  It certainly is not the case that the 
Economist's position can be classified as "irrational" in the sense of having 
clearly failed to take account of and consider the arguments for the belief that 
the gold discoveries  would raise the price level. 
Two further years of gold production do not change the newspaper's 
unwillingness to see the Rand gold discoveries as a source of inflation.  On 
January  16,  1897  the  newspaper  congratulates  itself on  having  avoided 
speculating  about the likely effects of increased gold production: "When the first 
important spurt in the new supplies of gold took place... there was a good deal of 
talk about the possible effect of the increased production  upon the prices both of 
commodities  and of securities; but no such result has yet made itself apparent. 
{T]he fact is that this large increase in the output of gold has produced very little 
appreciable effect... for the... reason that... an increased production of three or 
four millions a year is, relatively speaking. a small matter."  And by July the 
Economist suspects  that the entire Rand gold field is close to the edge and is only 
marginally profitable:  "Of the 46 Witwatersrand mines which were crushing 
during the first quarter... the yield of no less than eighteen was under 30s a ton, 
and only ten mines yielded over 40s a ton.  Until very recently the average total 
cost on the Rand for working a ton of ore was quite 30s" (July 10, 1897).  The 
only hope they see for a continuation,  let alone expansion, of the pace of mining 
on the Rand is if the employers' cartel is successful at reducing the wages of 
Black miners. 
The Economist's  distrust of the permanence of the higher level of gold 
production is still apparent as late as 1904, when its South African correspondent 
writes:  "The  world's output  of gold  this  year  will  be...  not  less  than 
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new mines is not keeping pace with the exhaustion of those now being worked, 
and it seems  to me that in a few years the output must reach its zenith and then 
gradually decline" (September 17, 1904).  If the shift in production was not seen 
as permanent, then there is less reason for expecting  it to affect the price level. 
Some South African mines did close unexpectedly.  Wheatcroft (1986 
notes in particular the large losses incurred by speculators  in the shares of South 
African mines in the late 1880's as allegedly promising mines closed.  South 
African mines continued to be perceived on the London capital market as highly 
speculative investments throughout the pre-WWI period,  perhaps reflecting 
uncertainty about the likelihood of widespread  mine closings.' 
Only in 1908 do we find forecasts of inflation.  The first comes in a lette. 
to the editor.  C.H. Bennett predicts that "there will be a rise  in about ten years 
of between 5  and  15  percent in  general prices..,  if no  other great  inuluencc 
interferes..., The great stimulation of industry, causing a high rate of interest. 
will naturally lower the price of fixed interest-hearing  securities  in the long run" 
(April11,  1908).  He sees not only a link between gold mining and prices but 
also a link between inflation and the rate of interest.  But he speaks of the Fisher 
effect—the lowering of the price  of fixed  interest-bearing  securities—as 
something  that has not yet occurred but that will come to pass "in the long run." 
And on December 5, 1908 comes the Economist's attribution of the rise in prices 
since 1896 to the increase  in the gold stock.  In response to the question  "Has 
Gold Depreciated?" the newspaper  answers in the affirmative:  "The quantitative 
theory of money, with such modifications as have become necessary with the 
wider  use  of credit,  undoubtedly  holds  the ground."  But  even  here  the 
newspaper eschews forecasts of future inflation. 
1These investments turned out ex post  to have been disappointing. Frankel (1967) calculated thai 
the realized return to all South  African gold mining equity over 1887-1913 was 2.1% per year. 
which is to be contrasted with a realized return on South African banking equity of 10.5% per 
year over 1870-1913. See Edelstein (1982). 30  Forecasting Pre-WWI inflation 
The Economist notes that modem economies can successfully economize 
or not on expensive gold:  "The spread of banking.. and the development  of the 
use of cheques, have checked a demand for gold which might otherwise have 
sprung up.... The effect of this economy is very difficult to measure, but its 
direct tendency is unmistakable, and must have been very powerful."  Stress is 
placed on the increased demand for gold arising from an enlargement of the area 
covered by  the gold standard.  "If other  commodities are  unchanged,  and 
population and business are the same, then if a sovereign is reduced to the value 
of half-a-sovereign, double the nun ber of sovereigns will be required to make 
the same payments," but "the qualification  that other things must be the same is 
very important..." (December 28,  1872). 
To  place the concerns  of the Economist's  editors  in  an analytical 
framework, consider the forward-looking  version of the simple monetary model 
of Cagan (1956) (see Sargent (1979)).  Let money demand be given by: 
(1)  -X(Ep1-p) 
where  m and p are the logs of the money stock and the price level, respectively. 
The log of the money stock is the sum of the log of the gold stock and the log 
money multiplier: 
(2)  m 
We assume that the money multiplier may bear a systematic negative relation to 
the gold stock:  both central banks  and private institutions economize on gold 
when it is scarce. 
(3)  = 
Last, we assume that the proportional rate of increase in the gold stock gt = gi 
- gt-1 is very persistent from year-to-year with a high probability p, but that 
with a small probability 1 —p  in any given year any current bulge in mining may 
disappear and production  may drop down to its trend level.  In either case, there 31  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflatioi 
is also a white-noise  disturbance Vt: 
+  with probability  p 
(4)  = 
v  with probability 1-p 
In this model the expected inflation rate is given by: 
(  p0-0) 
(5)  EjAP+1J 
=  ________ 
1 +X(1-p) 
Expected inflation is proportional  to the rate of increase of the gold stock, 
with a coefficient not in general equal to one.  The coefficient  depends on three 
parameters:  the money demand elasticity X,  the probability p that gold mining 
will persist at any present high level, and the value 0 of the parameter governing 
the endogenous offset of gold discoveries  by changes in the gold ratio within the 
world's banking system.  If a current high rate of gold mining is thought very 
likely to persist indefinitely  (p close to one) and  if endogenous  offset is small (0 
near zero), then inflation will move point-for-point  with gold mining.  However, 
if the exhaustion of mines is thought a serious possibility or if the endogenous 
offset is  seen as large, then a rational Economist would not believe that the 
expansion of gold production in the 1890's signaled a commensurate  rise in the 
inflation  rate. 
Consider what happens in a period in which gold production does in fad 
collapse.  In such a period, actual inflation exhibits a large negative deviation 
from trend with a consequent large real capital gain to the holders of nominal 
assets.  This small probability of a collapse in gold production is sufficient  to 
keep the inflation premium in nominal  interest rates below the rate that prevails 
during a gold rush. 
Moreover, from the perspective of an analyst in the  1890's, the past 
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the offset parameter 0 will be in the changed monetary environment of the end 
of the nineteenth century or what the persistence p of gold mining is likely to be 
in the new and technologically  untried mines of South Africa.  Accordingly, a 
refusal to take any past correlation  between gold and prices as indicative of the 
future is comprehensible. 
If any set of investors and writers were using lagged gold production to 
forecast future inflation, one would  expect  to find traces in the Economist.  It 
was a newspaper that had long  cherished close connections with the dismal 
science. It had no institutional or political bias against the quantity theory—its 
very refusals to forecast inflation are in general justified by the language of the 
quantity theory.  And it paid great attention to the rate at which gold was being 
mined throughout the world. 
Yet  the newspaper  always, up until  1908,  assesses the confused  and 
complex situation  in  such a way as to reject the  conclusion  that  the  god 
discoveries of the 1890's will be followed by price inflation.  And it has good 
reasons, or at least defensible rationalizations, for its judgments:  the morley 
multiplier is changing, the velocity of money is changing, the rate of growth of 
real output in the world is changing as industrialization  spreads, the increase in 
gold mining will have no appreciable  influence on the rate of growth of the gold 
stock,  or the Rand deposits cannot be mined for  long without  becoming 
exhausted.  Though the newspaper's forecasts are wrong cx post and use of them 
would lead to rejection of the joint null of rational expectations and the Fisher 
effect at standard significance levels, we cannot bring ourselves to say that the 
Economist was not processing available information  in a reasonable fashion.  E￿ 
p..t, their judgments about  the structure  of the economy and the lessons to be 
learned from the 1850's were wrong.  But when  considered from an  ante 
standpoint,  their  forecasts  and  arguments  appear  to  be  a  serious  and 
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level. 
V.  ADDITIONAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
We have argued that the lack of correlation between interest rates and 
that component  of  inflation  forecastable  from  gold  production  suggests, 
according to the standard rules of rational expectations econometrics, a failure 
of investor rationality.  Yet this conclusion hinges on two assumptions: that the 
real interest rate was stationary over the classical gold standard, and that there is 
no "peso problem"—a small probability event that does not occur in the sample 
and yet is important enough to have siiificant effects on expectations embodied 
in interest rates. 
Marginal Product of Capital 
Our conclusions could be reversed if there was a persistent, downward 
shift in the underlying relevant marginal product of capital around  1896.  If 
there was such a downward shift,  then the Fisher effect could have held and 
would in fact have predicted no significant movement in nominal rates:  the 
downward movement  in  the ex  ante real rate being offset by the upward 
movement in the drift in the price level.  But Barsky and Summers (1988) and 
Hirschfeld (1988) find no trace of such a movement in required real rates of 
return.  Indeed,  they  find  the required  rate  of return  in  the stock  market 
mirrored the price level, starting to rise a bit after 1896 in both the U.S. and the 
U.K, as can be seen in the U.S. dividend  yield plotted in figure 12. 
There are signs that the productivity of capital  in  Britain may  have 
declined significantly in the second half of our sample.  Between the peaks of 
1898 and  1929, output per capita in Britain  rises at the slow pace of 0.3 percent 
per year, substantially less than either the 1.4 percent per year recorded over 34  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
1870-1898  or the 1.6 percent per year recorded over  1929-1973 (Feinstein 
(1972)). And according to Edeistein (1982),  Sixteen out of seventeen industries 
have a lower real rate of return over 1897-1909 than over 1887-1896. 
Nevertheless, a real interest rate-based explanation of the apparent failure 
of the Fisher effect would require that the marginal product of capital in Britain 
determine the required real rate of return worldwide.  In view of the size of 
capital outflows from the U.K. before World War I to countries of European 
settlement  (e.g.,  Argentina,  Canada, Australia,  and the U.S.), we  find this 
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The assumption that the sample distribution matches  the  population 
distribution (i.e., no peso problem) is on more shaky ground.  We have already 
discussed the potential peso problem associated with an unobserved collapse of 
gold production.  There is one additional event that was possible and did not 
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occur:  a  political victory for  free silver  forces in  the United  States and  a 
consequent  devaluation.  The failure of a Fisher effect is stronger in  United 
States than in United Kingdom data.  It may be that for the United States the 
magnitude of the apparent failure  of the Fisher effect  is doubled by the coinci- 














Before  1897 it was not certain that the United States would remain on 
gold.  An investor in London seeking an equivalent sterling rate of return would 
have demanded a premium face interest rate on dollar-denominated assets to 
compensate for the perceived possibility of United States abandonment of the 
gold standard and free coinage of silver. Although the United States did stay on 
gold, it would have been irrational ex ante to assume that it would remain on 
gold with certainty (Goodwyn (1978)).  After 1897, populism disappeared as a 
FIGURE  13 
SHORT-TERM  INTEREST  RATE  DIFFERENTIAL 5ETWEEN  US  AND  UK 
— Short—Term Interest Rete Di fferenti  el  — 1897—1914 Ave rage 
I  I  I 
1900  905 
I 
910  1875  1880  1885  1590  895 
Veer 36  Forecasting Pre-\VWI Inflation 
political force and  free silver disappeared from the political agenda.  The 
expected depreciation  premium that United States nominal interest rates arguably 
commanded over British rates before 1897 was most likely gone by the decade 
and a half before World War I (see figure 13). 
United States interest rates during the first half of our 1870-1913  sample 
may thus suffer from a peso problem.  Ex ante sterling-denominated United 
States interest rates were persistently lower than ex pot  sterling  denominated 
interest rates.  Calomiris  and Hubbard (1987) document the association between 
changes in United States and United Kingdom short interest rates after  1898. 
Using quarterly data, the correlation between changes  in commercial  paper rates 
is .61  and the slope of a regression of changes in  United  States on  United 
Kingdom rates is .86 with a standard error of .14.  Using annual average data, 
the correlation between changes  in yearto-year  averages is .89, and the regres- 
sion slope is .87 with a standard error of .12. 
Such tight relationships  do  not hold  for  the pre-1896  period,  when 
popuhsm was strong.  Using annual average data, the correlation  between 
changes in short-term commercial  paper rates is .53 and  the correlation between 
long-term bond rates is .04.  A considerable  part of the shifts in yields calculated 
for United States long-term  bonds is due to changing perceived probabilities of 
bankruptcy for United States corporations.  However, the failure of anything 
like interest parity to hold for New York and London commercial paper rates 
before 1896 suggests that perceived exchange risk was breaking the link between 
short-term rates that one would expect to see under the gold standard. 
A difficulty with attributing  shifts in  the London-New York nominal 
interest rate differential to a free silver peso problem is that such an explanation 
implies an implausibly  high probability of success  for the free silver movement. 
While the United States was on the international  gold standard—1879  to 19 13— 
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States over  1879-1896  and  1.6% higher over 1897-1913.  If we attribute the 
post-1896 drop in the average interest differential  by one percentage point to the 
removal of a free silver peso problem and agree that the dollar was solidly 
established on the gold standard after  1896, then the expected  depreciation of the 
dollar over the 1879-1896  interval was about  one percent a year.  The sixteen to 
one ratio of silver to gold proposed by free-silver advocates implied a maximum 
devaluation of the dollar by 25% should a free silver victory occur.  Thus the 
probability that the gold standard would collapse in any given year must have 
been at least four times the expected depreciation  of the dollar, or a four percent 
chance per year on average.  Thus the probability that the gold standard would 
survive intact from 1879 to 1896 ws no greater than (0.96)17  0.50. 
Such a high  probability  of free-silver  victory  fits  uneasily  with  the 
assessment of American historians that the populist,  free-silver Democrats had 
little chance of putting their policies into effect.  They were a regional, pro- 
inflation  interest that developed little  support outside their midwestern heartland 
(Goodwyn (1976); Hofstadter (1948)).  The fact that backing out depreciation 
expectations from London-based interest differentials gives such a different 
assessment of the probabilities of populist success from the interpretations of 
historians gives us pause.  It might well be the case that historians, writing with 
hindsight,  have  given  the  dominance  of sound money  policies  an air  of 
inevitability which they did not possess at the time,  or it might be that other 
factors are influencing the New York-London  interest differential. 
VI.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Many tests reject rational expectations because orthogonality conditiom 
are not  satisfied (Rotemberg (1984)).  These  conditions  have  the  natural 
interpretation that forecast errors should be uncorrelated with variables known 38  Forecasting Pre-WWT Inflation 
to be in  agents information  sets.  In the historical  situation  studied  here, 
orthogonality conditions fail.  The expectations of inflation  found in  interest 
rates do not depend on gold production in the same way that actual inflation 
depends on production. Such a finding is indicative of suboptimal  forecasting if 
investors can determine the workings of the economy.  But we do not necessarily 
see the actual discussion of the relationship between gold discoveries and the 
price level contained in the Economist as showing a failure to rationally process 
available information. The Economist's model of the economy did turn out to 
be incorrect cx post.  But this does not mean that the Economist was irrational in 
believing that increases  in gold production were not likely to be of enough mag- 
nitude to change the long-term drift of the price level.  The Economist's failure 
to predict inflation cannot be easily traced either to an obvious flaw in logic or to 
an obvious failure to note pieces of readily available  information. 
We have argued that the failure of agents to exhibit "foresight" with 
regard to the change in the trend inflation  rate after 1896,  while inconsistent 
with some tests of "rational expectations," is not persuasive  evidence  that 
investors were negligent or naive in processing information.  Rather, the absence 
of a pre-1914 Fisher effect is not completely  surprising once one realizes that 
previous  experience  with  gold  discoveries did not necessarily  provide  an 
adequate basis on which to judge either the extent to which the flow of new gold 
would continue at its rapid rate or the extent to which the institutions governing 
the velocity of gold might adjust endogenously to the change in  the rate of 
mining.  The fact that there  had been a (weak)  correlation  between  gold 
production and price changes in the 1850's would  not necessarily lead one to 
expect this correlation  to hold in the different  mining and monetary environment 
of the 1890's. 
From the perspective of the mid-1890's, how would an investor rationally 
decide what structural parameters would be appropriate for understanding the 39  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
future  relationship  between  gold  and  inflation?  These  issues  are  easily 
overlooked by the econometrician, who can with hindsight estimate the "true 
model" and may ignore the range of parameter values that may have appeared 
possible to investors at the time.  Economists  today reach little agreement on the 
structure of the economy. Different economists  believe that expectational  errors 
are orthogonal to  different information sets.  It  thus seems  overly harsh  to 
conclude that a failure of expectations  implicit in prices to match up with a par- 
ticular favorite model is evidence of a failure by investors to adequately use the 
information at their disposal. 40  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
APENDIX: THE FISHER EFFECT  AS A LONG  RUN PHENOMENON 
Suppose that one-period invesffiients in real capital yield a risky expected 
real rate of return of pt, and let ö be the net real risk premium required on 
oominal bonds.  Then by definition: 




(A2)  rt 
= 
[he nominal  rate  equals the required real rate rt plus expected inflation pt+  1. 
mposing rational expectations: 
(A3)  i  =  + 
where t+  1  has the usual properties of an expectational  error.  In the absence of 
:vidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that rt is a  stationary 
stochastic process.  The inflation rate pt+l, however, will in general fail to be 
tationary.  Over a sufficiently long time interval, policies will  change or the 
underlying structure will change and impart some drift or jump  to  average 
inflation. 
The assumptions that the real rate is stationary and the inflation rate is an 
integrated process themselves guarantee that in the long run the economy will 
exhibit a Fisher effect, that a properly-instrumented  regression of nominal rates 
on  inflation rates  will  produce  a  coefficient of one. 1  Consider such  an 
instrumental variables regression of it on pt÷  1, using a valid2 instrument3 xt 
11f the inflation rate is stationary, then the Fisher coefficient will be less than one and will be 
closely linked to the persistence of the inflation process.  See McCallum  (1984) and Barsky 
(1987). 
2xt possesses a nonzero correlation with p+  1 (and thus must be itself non-stationary) but is 
uncorrelated  with t. 
3We can allow  this instmment to be  correlated with ex  ante real interest rates without changing the 
asymptotic results. 41  Forecasting Pre-WWI Inflation 
over some time interval [0, TI.  The expected value of the regression coefficient 
is: 
0  a 
(A4)  E(3)  1- 
EX  + 
c  a 
(p)(x)  (p)(x) 
where a's represent population values over the interval 10, TI conditional  on the 
state of the economy at time zero.  As the time interval [0, TI becomes longer, 
the second and third terms of the right hand side of (4) disappear.  Because  x is a 
valid instrument, OEX=O.  And since rt is stationary  while zpt and x are not: 
a 
(AS)  lini  =0 
T->  a 
(p)(x) 
by the Cauchy-Schwartz  inequality,  and so: 
(A6)  Iim{E)} 
=  1 
This  is  simply a  restatement of the point that the Fisher effect  is a 
proposition about the long run reaction of interest rates to permanent shifts  in 
the mean rate of inflation.  As long as inflation  is subject to permanent shocks 
and real interest rates are subject to  only transitory shocks, an instrumental- 
variable regression of interest rates on inflation should yield a coefficient of one 
over a sufficiently long sample.1 
1Summers' (1983)  use of band-spectral  regression was motivated  by a desire to make 
convergence of  this coefficient to one more rapid by improving the small sample properties of  the 
estimate. 42 
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